Personnel | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total |
Killed In Action | 6 | 37 | 43 |
Seriously Wounded In Action | 1 | 27 | 28 |
Lightly Wounded In Action | 7 | 171 | 178 |
Seriously Injured In Action | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Lightly Injured In Action | 0 | 29 | 29 |
Missing In Action | 0 | 4 | 4 |
Total | 14 | 268 | 282 |
b, Vehicular
Type | Destroyed or Abandoned | Evacuated Carrier | |
H/T M3 | 1 | ||
Tank, Med. w/75mm Gun | 4 | 2 | |
Truck, 1/4 Ton 4x4. | 3 | 6 | |
Truck, 2 1/2 Ton 6x6 Cargo 2 | 2 | ||
Trailer, 1 Ton Cargo | 1 | ||
Ambulance, 3/4 Ton, 4x4 | 1 | ||
Total | 10 | 10 |
3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES
Type | Expended | Loss Due to Enemy Action |
Carbine, Cal, .30 7130 | 7130 | |
Cal, 30 | 71263 | 6000 |
Cal, 45 | 20980 | |
Cal, 50 | 36408 | |
60mm | 88 | |
81mm | 230 | |
37mm | 1304 | |
57mm | 17 | |
75mm Gun | 6120 | |
75mm Howitzer | 2398 | 400 |
76mm Gun | 182 | |
90mm Gun | 4871 | |
3" Gun | 522 | |
105mm Howitzer | 19706 | |
155mm Gun | 1397 | |
Grenades (all types) | 1011 | |
Rockets, AT | 132 | |
Total Tonnage | 998.86 | 5.00 |
============================================================================
(Letter, Report after Action Against enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Arnd Div)
4. On 1 November 1944 units or the Division were commanded by the following named officers:
5th Armd Div - MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA
Combat Command "A" - BRIG GEN EUGENE A REGNIER, 08295, USA
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF
Combat Command "B" - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF
5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA
Reserve Command - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF
Hq 5th Brmd Div Tn - COL GUSTIN M NELSON, 014512, INF (1-7 Nov 44)
Replaced by LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV, par 1, SO 230, Hq 5th Armd Div, 8-30 Nov 44).
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011S81, CAV
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 335298, CAV
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SG
85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz - MAJ GEORGE G BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0242156, INF
34th Tank Bn - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV, (1-8 Nov 44 ).
Relieved per par 1, SO 230, Hq 5th Armd Div, 8 Nov 44;
Succeeded by LT COL WILLIAM L CABNISS, 0293176, INF, (Atchd)
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLEN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV
46th Armd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF
47th Armd FA Bn - LT CCL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA
71st Armd FA Bn- LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FB
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FB
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGIEU, 020575, CE
127th Ord Maint Bn - MAJOR ROLAND S BIERSACH, 0318269, ORD
75th Med Bn, Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MC
5. NARRATIVE.
During the month of November the Division did not operate as a Division against the enemy,
but on three (3) occasions, however, units of the Division participated in combat operations.
During the period 1 to 5 November, CCB continued patrol action and the defense of a zone
in the KALTERHERBERG area, CCB was moved to the- vicinity of NEUDORF, BELGIUM in
preparation for action on order of V Corps. The Division established an advance CP in the
vicinity of NEUDORF in order to more conveniently control the action of CCA, The remainder
of the Division continued in the WAIMES - FAYLONVILLE area with the Division CP in the vicinity
of MCDERSCHEID. Training for future operations was continued.
During the period 6 thru 10 November, the Division less CCB, had a defensive holding mission
in the KALTERHERBERG sector of the Corps line.
===============================================================================================
(Letter, Report after Action Against enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Arnd Div)
On November 8, CCB was placed under army control and the Division, less CCB, was placed in
Corps reserve. CCB continued the defense of the KALTERHERBERG area until relieved by the 99th
Division at 1500, 10 November, to VII Corps and moved to the vicinity of WALHORN on 10
November.
CCB was moved to an assembly area in the MODERSCHEID-SCHOPPEN area at 1700 on 11 November,
The 85th Cav Rcn Eq was moved to the 102d Cavalry zone in general support of the 102d and the
85th Cav Rcn Sq CP was established three (3) Kilometers Southeast of EUPEN. The remainder
of the Division CP moved from MODERSCHEID and closed with the advance CP in the vicinity of
NEUDORF at 1500.
From 12 thru 14 November, the Division continued its preparation for action, with CCR in VII
Corps Zone at WALHORN preparing a plan of attack against the town of VOSSENACK.
CCA and CCB prepared plans to repel any possible breakthrogh in the North Sector of the
V Corps Zone. The Division, in general, continued training for future operations.
During the period from 13 thru 25 November, the 85th Cav Rcn Sq remained in general support
of the 102d Cav Group; CCA continued in readiness to support CCB in the event or a possible
breakthrough by the enemy. On 17 November, CCB moved from the FAYMONVILLE area to the vicinity
of ROTGEN. Further planning was made to repel any possible enemy breakthrough in the
LAMMERSDORF-ROTT area. The Division Artillery was moved from the KALTER-HERBERG area to the
vicinity of ROTGEN on 18 November.
CCR reverted to Division control from attachment to VII Corps at 1700A, 19 November. At 2400A,
19 November, CCR was attached to the 8th Division. On order of V CORPS, CCB moved the 15th
Armd Inf Bn to an assembly area 2 Kilometers East of LAMMERSDORF to provide an immediate
available force in event of an enemy attempt to attack towards EUPEN.
Troop "D", 85th Cav Rcn Sq, was attached to CCB, CCR continued in attachment to the 8th Division
and was committed on 25 November, in an attack on the town of HURTGEN.
During the period 26 November thru 30 November, the Division, less CCR continued training and
planning for future operations.
During the period in which CCR, attached to the 8th Division, was engaged in the
HURTGEN-KLEINHAU area, many difficulties were encountered. Enemy mines and soggy ground made
movement of tanks almost impossible and intense enemy mortar fire, artillery fire, and
anti-personnel mines made dismounted advances most difficult. The 47th Armd Inf Bn and Co C"
22d Armd Engr Bn, suffered heavy casualties from small arms, artillery, and mines.
Several Tank Commanders were lost due to enemy time fire and snipers.
On 29 November, the Division, less CCR, was relieved from attachment to V Corps and attached
to VII Corps at 1200A. CCR remained attached to
================================================================================================
(Letter, Report after Action Against enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Arnd Div)
8th Infantry Division. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion (of CCA)
moved to the 4th Infantry Division zone and was attached to the 22d
Regimental Combat Team by VII Corps. On this date CCR captured KLEINHAU
and the high ground to the Northeast in the face of heavy enemy
artillery and mortar fire.
On 30 November CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and moved
to the 4th Infantry Division Zone at 1000A, closing at 1400A in the
vicinity of ZWEIFALL. Preparations were made for the relief of the 85th
Cav Rcn Sq and CCB by the 9th Infantry Division in V Corps Sector. The
46th Armored Infantry Battalion attacked with the 22d Regimental Combat
Team at 0700A to seize high ground Northeast of KLEINHAU. Resistance was
strong and the 46th's casualties mere heavy.
6. COMMENTS.
Section I - Personnel Matters
a. Comments made in the September and October report remain generally
applicable.
b. As far as replacements are concerned, however, to the
problems previously mentioned has been added inadequate stockage of both
officer and enlisted replacements. As is usually the case, the
proportion of platoon leaders and NC0's lost is greater than privates;
while the resultant loss in combat efficiency is often greater. Return
of wounded, appointments and promotions or NCO’s have
been wholly inadequate to offset losses. Increase in officers and
enlisted replacements from the United States is believed the only
solution. If this can be done, stockage in the replacement depots can be
maintained at high enough levels to permit filling requisitions as they
are received.
Section III- Intelligence Matters
From reports of units operating in our immediate area, during the
period, it is evident that the enemy is engaging more in night attacks.
Some of these night attacks were reported to be in strength
approximating one infantry regiment supported by as much as a company of
tanks.
Enemy's desire to limit the effectiveness of our artillery and fighter
bomber support and his familiarity with the ground were factors which
probably caused him to discard his former dislike for night attacks.
A marked increase in the number of automatic weapons in German units
encountered was noted.
Air Reconnaissance continued to improve and the system as
inaugurated whereby broadcast is made from the airfield as soon as
pilots return from missions, enabled the Division to keep a much better
picture of the enemy situation. Aerial photographs continued to improve.
By rapid delivery and interpretation, much timely intelligence was
obtained.
================================================================================================
(Letter, Report after Action Against enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div)
PWs taken during November numbered 77 and the number killed (estimated)
was 140.
Section III Operations
Most of the period was devoted to training and maintenance, It should
be noted that weather conditions and the locations necessarily occupied
by the division made anything but limited training impossible. Crew
drill for crew served weapons was carried on daily and a small amount of
firing of new and reconditioned weapons was accomplished, During the
latter half of the period daily communications exercises were conducted
throughout the Division.
Section IV- Supply and Maintenance Matters
Maintenance activities were hampered by lack of suitable hard standing
and the excessive distance between line units and the 127th Ordnance
Maintenance Battalion.
Personnel of the Division have shown marked improvement in supply
discipline regarding the care of empty gasoline cans.
The threatened high casualty rate from Trench Foot was checked by the
issue of overshoes. No new cases have been reported since the last issue
was completed.
Duck bills (extended track connectors) have materially improved the
performance of medium tanks over muddy and soft terrain. Supply during
November has permitted each tank to be equipped with duck bills.
Performance in winter mud will be further improved when this track
modification can be completed.
Trucks of the two (2) attached Quartermaster Truck Companies have
averaged seven hundred thirty nine (739) miles per truck per month for
the past two months.
The relative comfort and warmth of the newly issued sleeping
bag over the regular issue of GI blankets was initially a controversial
subject. However, after a short period of trial, all personnel who had
given this item a fair trial were universal in their praise of it.
For the Commanding General:
EDWARD G. FARRAND,
Colonel, C. S. C.,
Chief of Staff
==============================================================================================