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 APR 20 1945
 DATE: 8 May 1945
 BY: ACB

HEADQUARTERS
 6888th CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON MECHANIZED
 APO No 255, U S Army

8 May 1945

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
 (Reference: PAR 29, M 100-206, G-3)

APRIL 1945

- a. Campaign of GERMANY
- b. Losses in Action

1. Personnel

Killed	07	15	11
Wounded	00	00	00
Injured	00	00	00
Missing	00	00	00
Captured	00	00	00
TOTALS	07	15	11

DOWNGRADED TO:
 CLASSIFICATION REMOVED
 BY AUTHORITY OF TAG LIG

Date: 1 Feb 46 Initials: HSP

2. Vehicular

- (a) Car, Armored, M-8, No. W-2033200, was abandoned due to enemy action.
- (b) Car, Armored, M-8, No. W-2033200, was captured by the enemy.
- (c) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2030722, was hit by enemy fire and abandoned.
- (d) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2033200, was damaged beyond repair as result of enemy gunfire.
- (e) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2047721, was damaged beyond repair and abandoned due to enemy action.
- (f) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2040118, was abandoned due to enemy action.
- (g) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2044307, was abandoned due to enemy action.
- (h) Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, No. W-2044704, was captured by the enemy.
- (i) Two (2) Trailers, cargo, 1 ton, Nos. W-0404250 and W-0404256, were wrecked and abandoned in night operation against the enemy.

3. Commanders

SQUADRON COMMANDER: 1 April 1945 to 20 April 1945 - Lt. Col. GEORGE C. BENJAMIN, 023422, Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE TROOP: 1 April 1945 to 20 April 1945 - Captain PAUL C. PETERS, 0101011, Cavalry.



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TROOP A: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - Captain **WALTER E. SCOTT**, 020638, Cavalry.

TROOP B: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - Captain **LOREN E. VIGORS**, 02012532, Cavalry.

TROOP C: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - Captain **GEORGE W. BASQUEL**, 02012516, Cavalry.

TROOP D: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - 1st Lt. **EDWARD J. MC GINN**, 02012549, Cavalry.

TROOP E: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - 1st Lt. **PETER M. SOUTHER**, 02012549, Cavalry.

COMPANY F: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - Captain **JOHN T. SCHMARS**, 02010286, Cavalry.

MEDICAL DETACHMENT: 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 - Captain **MEYER BRINDENTHAL**, Medical Corps.

g. Attachments - Troop C attached to Combat Command "H" 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945. Troops A and B attached to Combat Commands "A" & "B" respectively 1 April 1945 to 30 April 1945.

Assignments - None.

h. See map and overlays.

i. Ammunition expenditures:

Carbine, cal. .30, ball	22,500 rounds
Rifle, cal. .30	9,500 rounds
Machine Gun, cal. .30	48,500 rounds
Sub-machine Gun, cal. .45	15,500 rounds
Machine Gun, cal. .50	4,500 rounds
Grenades, hand, all types	200
Grenades, rifle, all types	200
37 MM Gun, M1	200
37 MM Gun, M7	100
37 MM Gun, coaxial	20
60 MM Mortar, M1	500
60 MM Mortar, illum.	5
75 MM Howitzer, M1	200
75 MM Howitzer, M7	20
75 MM Howitzer, Recoil	15
75 MM Howitzer, Coaxial	5
Pets, smoke	15
Rocket, 2.35", M1	2
Mine, M7	1

- k. (1) Not applicable.
- (2) Not applicable.
- (3) Not applicable.
- (4) Not applicable.
- (5) Not applicable.
- (6) Not applicable.
- (7) Excellent.
- (8) See Section V.

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- (9) Not applicable.
- (10) Not applicable.
- (11)

The mission assigned the Squadron during the period was not very stimulating and there is little of value to report. Activities consisted of providing escort for fuel trains, occupying and governing areas in conjunction with Division Trains, blocking traffic, screening the population and searching for enemy soldiers, arms, war material and installations. No problems worth mentioning were encountered aside from the by-now normal headaches of dealing with enemy civilians and vast numbers of slave laborers in a country thoroughly disorganized by the progress of the war. The attack of the enemy division Von Glasewitz through the Corps zone from the north created some confusion and for a time the lines of supply and communication were disrupted. While no contact was made by this Squadron with the Von Glasewitz, a good many Prisoners of War were taken from this outfit and much information gained which helped higher headquarters complete their picture of the ways and whereabouts on Von Glasewitz.

Comments

Section I - Personnel Matters:

(1) (a) **Morale:** The general morale rating has been excellent. The most determining factor has been the successful participation by all personnel in what is believed to be the final victorious stages of the campaign. Long continuous movements deeper into Germany have been extremely satisfying and have brought a feeling of final accomplishment of a long, difficult, and dangerous task. From about 25 April 1945 to 30 April 1945 all personnel have been billeted in generally satisfying situations. The mail has been arriving in regular deliveries.

(b) **Discipline:** No courts-martial for the entire month tried within the Squadron.

(c) **Reinforcements:** Fifty-five enlisted men received. The need, in numbers, has not been satisfied for either officers or enlisted men. The quality of reinforcements has been satisfactory.

(d) **Awards and Decorations:** One officer and one enlisted man were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross on 8 April 1945 at a ceremony. Colonel John T. Cole made the presentation. Troop A, this unit, was cited in General Orders, Headquarters 5th Armored Division.

Section II - Intelligence Matters: Not applicable.

Section III - Operations: No comment.

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters.

(1) No outstanding or unusual occurrences were reported relative to performance of old or new equipment under battle conditions.

(2) In crossing the Rhine River and making the long, swift advance over the plains of Northern Germany, the policy of loading all trucks over their rated capacity, especially with gasoline, paid rich dividends in keeping the column rolling. All trucks came through the ordeal with no apparent damage, probably due to the prevalence of good roads.

(3) The automatic change (order from G-4 to Division Quartermaster rather than from unit to Division Quartermaster) to operational rations at outset of the Rhine crossing, and the automatic change from operational rations to "A" rations at the temporary halt at Herford proved highly successful. It allowed the maximum use to be made of kitchen facilities.

Section V - Civilian.

The civilian population, as their white flags indicated, were generally passive. Local burgemeisters were genuinely cooperative even those

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who had formerly been considered good Nazis. Civilian policemen who were appointed by this headquarters proved to be diligent workers and assisted in the maintenance of general order.

Requests for the turn in of weapons and German soldiers were promptly obeyed by all but a few who had buried weapons. These were discovered on information from displaced personnel and the civilians involved were tried by Military Government Summary Court.

In the town of Herford, Germany, looting and pillaging by civilians in mobs of up to one thousand people was rampant for several days immediately after conquest of the city but this was somewhat curbed when this unit left the area.

German anti-Nazis proved to be excellent informants and gave us sufficient information to arrest those who were dangerous or who had committed war crimes. However most of those high in party affairs had left the area but in at least two cases, minor party officials committed suicide when they learned that we were investigating them.

During the period displaced personnel were less troublesome than in the previous month. The exuberance of liberation having died down considerably and proper food and shelter having been provided, displaced personnel no longer looted and in most cases ceased their migration, apparently now content to sit and wait for evacuation through normal channels.

A total of two hundred eighty-seven prisoners of war were taken, most of them stragglers passing through or hiding out in the area.

SECTION VI - Reports from detached Troops.

1. History of Troop "A" (plus the 2nd Platoon of Troop "E") from 31 March to 27 April 1945.

On 31 March 1945, Troop "A" was assigned to CCA and proceeded to vicinity of Sarup (RA697703) to the command's assembly area. The command was acting in division reserve. The troop acted in liaison and assisted in the movement of the command to the vicinity of Sender. It became necessary on 1 April to select a new route. A Troop (minus the third platoon, which was maintaining liaison with division headquarters and another command) moved quickly over the new route, located enemy resistance pinned them down and gave valuable reports which enable the command to quickly eliminate the strong enemy resistance in Hiltrup and obtain a bridge head over the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Upon commitment of the command, troop A was assigned the mission of protecting the north flank until the command was in position to cross the canal. The troop then had the mission of reconnoitering routes so that the command could rejoin the division, little enemy resistance was met. The troop secured and marked routes and assisted the command in its move to the new assembly area north of Herford.

The troop remained in vicinity of Wittel (RB 688968) for five days. On the morning of the ninth the troop proceeded to locate route of advance and assisted the command in moving to vicinity of Ingeln, light resistance was encountered.

On the tenth the troop was assigned the mission of advance guard and of securing a route to and a crossing over the Oker River. The troop moved quickly on the mission. Secured two bridges suitable for the command to cross (one of which the enemy withdrew from after attempting to blow it up). The troop then reconnoitered routes and assembly areas for elements of the command in the vicinity of Ketein (RX8623). The troop outposted the perimeter of the command for the night.

At daylight on the 11 April the troop proceeded north from Meine to secure a crossing over the Aller Canal and to make contact with CCR.

This was done against light resistance the mission was then changed because the road net at Gifhorn was not suitable to accommodate both combat commands. The mission was changed to act as advance guard for the command as resistance increased the troop was relieved and assigned the mission of patrolling the extended route of advance and assist the 34th Tank Battalion in keeping it open. This mission plus the mission of assisting the 34th to rejoin the balance of the command continued during the following day. In the vicinity of Bruchau (RY388602) it was necessary for the troop to become heavily engaged with approximately 150 enemy infantry on the east flank of the route.

On the morning of 13 April the troop was assigned the mission of protecting the command's rear (S) and right (E) flank while it attacked north.

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The troop met stiff resistance in vicinity of Staffelde during the day. Staff Sergeant Ling, acting platoon leader of third platoon was captured. Direct 20mm and artillery fire were received spasmodically. On the morning of the fourteenth the troop was assigned the mission of patrolling and outposting the Elbe River within the commands boundary. During the night of the fourteenth the third platoon was forced to withdraw from the town of Staffelde (RZ 861532) during a concerted German counterattack one quarter ton was knocked out; one armored car was damaged and had to be abandoned. During the fifteenth the mission continued until approximately 1700B when relieved by the infantry. The first platoon met limited resistance in it's advance along the river north of Arneburg (RZ 888614). No Germans were allowed to cross the river in our zone.

During this phase of the operation a platoon of light tanks was attached to the troop. They operated an out post and acted as a mobile reserve. Forward observer attached to the troop at this time picked out and eliminated several targets including an enemy artillery battery.

The troop was relieved at approximately 1700B 15 April and proceeded to new area vicinity of Mannhausen (RY 373302). Here the command was to be in Corps reserve. Enemy pockets required that the command be used to eliminate them. The troop recon itered and secured routes for the command to move from vicinity of Mannhausen to Knesebach (RY 008518) in preparation to mopping up a large wooded area. The troop outposted the command's area and contacted friendly units to the north. Upon completion of the command's mission the troop moved to Wendischbreme (RY 160515) and outposted the north section of the command's new area.

On the morning of the 19th the troop was relieved of attachment to CCA and assigned to CCB. No contact could be made and the troop with the third platoon as advance guard to make physical contact at approximately two miles northeast of Breme (RY 175500). A column of four Mark IV tanks, one large truck and one small truck crossed our path from northwest to southeast. Fire was brought on the enemy without success. Contact not being made with CCB information was transmitted immediately to CCA by radio and by mounted messenger to 85th Cavalry Squadron. The troop then reverted to CCA's control.

The troop was then assigned the mission of reconitering area north of the combat commands assembly area and screening the north flank.

During the night one section of the third platoon knocked out a Mark IV tank with an anti-tank mine and captured the crew.

On the morning of the twentieth the troop, plus a light tank platoon, moved out on the mission of reconitering an area and selecting a route of advance for the command and securing a line of departure for the command's attack the following day. The line was secured, information was quickly sent back and reinforcements were sent up to help hold the line. During the night the

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enemy attacked with armor and dismounted troops. The second platoon and a married platoon were forced to withdraw from the town of Wiedest. The line of departure was held sufficiently so that the command moved up promptly and jumped off as scheduled.

The troop then acted as liaison with the 29th Infantry Division and CCB and provided flank reconnaissance for the advance. The night of the 23rd the troop was employed as perimeter defense in the vicinity of Klense (RY 165869).

The troop continued on its mission of flank protection on the twenty-second. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Tellerdorf the troop reconnoitered and secured routes of advance and assembly areas for the units of CCA.

On the morning of the twenty-third the troop was assigned the mission of establishing and maintaining observation posts on the Elbe river. Fighting was much fiercer in the morning and a large number of prisoners were brought in. The troop took 147 prisoners including seven officers during the day. Three outposts were established on the river.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth the troop was assigned the mission of selecting a route for the command to return after relieve to the vicinity of Meine (RX 905240) and to reconnoiter the command's assembly area and assist the command in moving there. This mission was completed on the twenty-fifth of April.

The troop moved from Retgesbittel (RX 902280) to Brockel (RX 685389) on the 26th and reverted to Squadron control.

During the entire operation second platoon of B Troop was attached to the troop.

All Troop objectives were selected to assist the command in achieving its mission.

Enemy defenses were spotty and stiff when encountered.

Weather was ideal for fast moving operations.

Enemy skillfully used his weapons and personnel and made excellent use of camouflage.

Our men were in good physical condition and were eager and aggressive under fire and after continued strenuous missions.

Success in all mission is accredited mainly to aggressive attitude of all men of the troop. They had the winning complex.

SECTION VI cont'd.

2. Narrative on History of Troop "B" from 0001 30 March to 0001 27 April 1945. -

Troop B assigned to Combat Command "B" at 0001B 30 March 1945 with Third Platoon of Troop E attached. Joined CCB at Mulhausen (AO405) given mission of leading command from that point to bridge over Rhine River near Wesel to Munster on to contact any troops this side of Munster - Original plan was to have two platoons from Troop B go directly into Munster that night and reconnoiter two routes through Munster for the Task Force of CCB. However, at Appelhausen (A7866) west of Munster we contacted British who had reached that point and was engaged in a heavy battle in that town. We then spent the night in that area and next morning were given mission of finding a crossing of the Dortmund - Ems Canal south of Munster. Met CCR who had built a bridge across canal. We then went North, meeting some opposition and a heavy fight at Hilrath (just south of Munster). One man was wounded in this engagement and about four Germans killed by our small arm fire. Results of B Troop fire unknown but Hilrath was quite heavily defended as it guarded the approaches to the large bridge across canal at Munster. Mission was then changed to come back to CCR crossing and find a route for the command to be in position to block all roads from the east into Munster. First Platoon was given mission of protecting left flank of the command after turning north from the canal crossing. Rest of the troop led CCB. First platoon at Telgte (S 0874) met some resistance but were then met by a German officer with white flag (V-59) who stated that large percent of his troops were wounded and disgusted and would like to give up. But that there were also other troops in town and he didn't know if they would surrender or not. B-1 told him he would have to surrender town or take consequences. The officer then said he would confer with the other CO. Five minutes after he left a fire concentration hit the platoon wounding two men and knocked out one armored car. The one quarter ton vehicles were disbanded but recovered at dark, an hour later. Meantime, the command had given orders for rest of troop to go to Telgte and assist B-1 as this city controlled all main roads east of Munster. Third platoon leading knocked out four German vehicles and about 35 prisoners were taken en way to Telgte. First platoon had withdrawn and second platoon then leading received AT fire on entering Telgte from the East. Troop then retired east of the town and stayed the night April 2nd. First and third platoon worked with Task Forces of the command moving east and second platoon and headquarters moved north to protect that flank at a castle on this route, which had been a German CP, about 20 prisoners were taken. A half-track left there to pick up prisoners was swamped with them and later before they could leave they had one colonel, one major, two captains, two lieutenants and about 20 plain soldiers. Three of these were wounded and a small hospital was set up with the German Medical Colonel in charge. two amputations were made and next day half-track crew set out to find someone friendly, two days later this was accomplished.

Meanwhile, the second platoon of E Troop and headquarters continued en route. At Gilderf which seemed to be the only escape

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route from Munster a large amount of German traffic was met. B3 and B2 at this town knocked out two motorcycles, six trucks, two 75mm artillery pieces and generally had a fine day. From there they moved east to the next town. They were met by the burgemeister who surrendered the town with 1000 prisoners, all members of the hospital. From there we moved south to meet the command. At dark we were parallel but west of them one mile. They were heavily engaged and near the place we were to meet them we also were. Four men were injured and two one quarter ton vehicles were lost. This was from bazooka and small arm fire. Finally met OCB and were given out post job for night at Bedinghausen (B3787).

April 3rd we were given the mission of sending someone into town (B3789) to see if enemy still were there. Night before and that day, all day, as miserable rain prevailed and conditions were not too good. B1 and B3 traveled with the Task Force. B1 going well ahead and taking about fifty prisoners and making job of task force strictly a march. B2 and B3 plus headquarters again worked on the north flank. Decent going for a while but just south of Melle (4101) met dismounted resistance - killed twelve Germans and took six prisoners, two of them SS troops. Traveled east toward Bunde on way captured a train and destroyed engine. Train consisted of four cars of 88mm ammunition and three cars of 105mm ammunition.

Joined the command at Rehnie (W7402) just north of Bad Oeynhausen. Stayed in town and had first night's rest since crossing the Rhine. Next morning given mission of finding bridge across Weser river. B3 commanded by Staff Sergeant Stevens went with Task Force A to pass west of river. TFA held up there for three days. B3 took about fifty prisoners and located several AT guns for the TF.

B2 plus headquarters moved north on main road on west bank of river. South of Minden they were stopped by a road mine, on trying to remove mines, heavy artillery fire from other side of river drove them back. B2 then dismounted and moved to hill in position to observe town of Minden. Then they acted as artillery observers and also patrols killed six Germans. Their observation brought some very effective fire on town of Minden. All bridges were blown and troop assembled at Dahme (W7505) On way to join troop B1 was fired on by AT guns across river and Technician fifth grade Emmet Brown was seriously wounded in action, later dying of wounds.

Troops stayed in Dahme for four days with mission of protecting the command from the north. At this location Lt. JOHN E. LYNCH joined our troop and assumed command of B3.

8 April troop moved to Minden (W8006) to provide security for two bridges across the Weser.

10 April we left Minden and moved in column with OCB at 1200B to Hameln where we crossed the Weser River. Traveled all

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that night crossing Leine River at Sarstedt about 2400B continued to Peine (7016) then to Edemissen (7224) arriving at 0830B next morning. At 1200B we were given mission of contacting the Second Armored south of us. B1 accomplished this. B3 went north to attempt to contact British. Involved in fight and held at Wagenhell (8843). B2, B3 and headquarters traveled through Gifhorn (9135) on to a distance of five miles north and east of the town. At 1900B given mission of joining CCA at Kletze and working with them. Assembled the troop minus first platoon and proceeded to Kletze (3253). Arriving at about 0100B. No troops whatsoever in Kletze, we then followed tracks of armored vehicles to Peritz (Y5458) at 0530A, arrived there and reported to CCA. Given mission at 0630B to protect right flank of the command, while they attacked Tangumünde (8746). On this mission, which was executed in a very satisfactory manner, B3 killed about thirty Germans on ferry at (8934) and captured 200 prisoners. Also flushed eight planes out of landing strip there, of which CCA shot down five. B2 and B3 at Tangerhütte (Y7633) captured about fifteen prisoners and blew up two trains in woods, both loaded with ammunition.

13 April relieved from CCA and ordered to join CCB at Osterbury (Y7274). Captured eight prisoners on way and arrived at 1300B. Given mission of outposting Elbe River. B3 at (Y8979) B1 at (Y8877), B2 at (9072). Remained there three days and gave the command excellent observation reporting all movements of enemy in their zone. This gave the command very effective artillery fire but placed the platoons in very dangerous position. On 15 April a heavy artillery barrage fell on B2 and Sergeant Paul M. Vollette was seriously wounded and died on his way to the hospital. He remained at his post continuously until wounded.

16 April the troop traveled with the command on way to reserve area near Chelnitz (Y3762) at 1200B given mission of going south around the command area and reporting about information received of enemy troops in area near Brane. B1 and B3 combed woods northwest of there. Headquarters, B2 and B3 went north on highway to Mellin (Y2025) then to Ahluna (Y2160) then west to Radenbeck (Y1154) thence into forest south and west there. On entering forest we received AT fire and lost one quarter ton vehicle and had one man seriously injured, Private first class Robert Sherten. At dark returned to Jubar (Y1459) and set up road blocks for night. Same mission next day.

2300B 17 April given mission of outposting towns at (Headquarters at Weisdorf (1166), B1 at Weichensdorf (Y1767), B2 at Wallstave (Y2171) and B3 at Abbendorf (Y1466).

18 April same mission with patrols through area. Patrol going south from Weisdorf to Raddehath (Y0663) contacted British at Raddehath, who informed them that woods were full of Germans. Returning immediately on same route passed over one hour before, one of the one quarter ton vehicles spotted a group of Germans in woods and open fire immediately and killed crew and second and third machine gun then opened fire and Lt. Lynch and Pfc Abrey Smith were hit. The other vehicle maintained a steady fire and recovered bodies of Lt. Lynch and Pfc Smith. Patrol then returned to C at Weisdorf

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and the two bodies were sent to the command's rear.

That same night heavy tank and tracked and motor vehicles were heard to the north in woods. Everyone was very sure they were English and information could not be gotten that they were otherwise. At 0430B the next morning the column approached the town of Deisdorf and when the outpost could identify them they were in a position to lose their efficiency. As no information was gained from that outpost the column came up to the rear of another outpost and when identified in the dark they in turn moved away from their vehicles. In the confusion a German non-commissioned officer came to our CP and gave us a surrender ultimatum, either surrender or fight your way out. We decided to start moving right away and moved out on the only road left to us and with German vehicles commanding that road. However, the confusion seemed to be to everyone's benefit and we escaped cross country to Komke (Y1763). We observed the column pass through Deisdorf to Lindhof (Y1163) in a large wooded area there. The air corps and artillery went to work for about four hours and two days later approximately 100 vehicles were found knocked out or abandoned in that woods also Staff of Division Clauswitz was picked up at that time.

20 April moved up through Deisdorf to Dahre (Y1368) and outposted that area.

21 April contacted 29th Infantry Division and maintained contact with them and CP. Had same mission next day and then moved to Manum (Y1158), Jubar (Y1459) and Ludhof (Y1163) and outposted for the command. We were relieved from CPB and joined the Squadron on 26 April 1945.

Ammunition expenditure - No accurate record, but much heavier than normal due to flank job and a more than normal amount of fighting.

Physical condition of men very low at times when for instance we drove steady for 43 of 48 hours, also at times when outpost were moved into enemy areas in darkness.

Vehicular and radio maintenance bad, when moving so much and platoons almost constantly removed from troop headquarters. Men recuperate much faster than materials.

Value of underground very small because of time element. We went through at least twenty-five towns that there were reported links, etc, although they had been there at a late date, most workers couldn't give us recent information, which is of the most important to us.

When we had decent or normal reconnaissance missions, although they were rougher and sometimes disastrous the men were much more contented and much more successful, the loss of men and material on this mission was very heavy in proportion to the rest of the division, but nevertheless the men were doing the job they were trained for and could see the value of their work and of information and the part they were playing. I don't believe a combat command should be led by a reconnaissance platoon unless they can be given sufficient time to do reconnaissance, which they are trained for

SECTION VI, cont'd.

3. History of Troop "C" from 30 March to 25 April 1945.

At 110030 March 1945, "C" Troop was attached to Combat Command "R", 5th Armored Division to remain attached to this command until 0600B 25 April 1945. The attachment took place while the Troop was at Viersen, Germany and the troop moved to the Combat Commands assembly area in the vicinity of St. Genis (RA 1303) Nor D'Guerre, a move of approximately 12 miles.

At the assembly area the troop received orders to mark the route for the command, to an assembly area east of the Rhine River in the vicinity northeast of Dulmen. At Buldern, because of heavy fighting, the troop was ordered to reconnoiter a bypass south through Senden, (RA 8362), Nor D'Guerre. In attempting to reconnoiter this route, the troop encountered stiff resistance in the form of small arms, 20 millimeter and bazookas. This action taking place approximately 1 mile north of Senden. The troop and attachments suffered 10 casualties of varying severity. Although these casualties were inflicted, the troop was successful in its mission because the troop did clear out this pocket of resistance and proceeded into Senden, radioing back that the bridges had been blown on the canal Bele, south of the town. The distance traveled at this point was 88 miles.

With the mission unchanged, that is reconnoitering the axes of advance of the command, the troop moved out of Senden at 0830B 1 April 1945 reconnoitering a bivouac area 2 miles south of Greffen (RB 2874) Nor D'Guerre. The weather throughout this operation was extremely disagreeable being rainy and cold, slowing the operations because of the poor visibility. To expedite the reconnaissance of the route, one reconnaissance platoon would take the lead on the route, immediately behind them would be a married platoon acting as point. Upon contact with the enemy the point would immediately move up and take over the fighting. The reconnaissance platoon would change into the following formation. Two scout section peeps and one armored car for long distance communication. This became known as the tankers "Cat Eyes".

The next day the troop bivouaced 2 miles west of Herford, covering a distance of 35 miles. Resistance being extremely light and of the delaying type, the troop continued route reconnaissance advancing 27 miles on the 3rd of April. The resistance began to stiffen at this point, the Combat Command destroyed eleven 88 millimeter guns, one light tank and many trucks in the vicinity of Vlothe (RB 7692). Bad Oyenhausen surrendered to the 3rd platoon of the troop taking four 88 millimeter guns intact and 200 prisoners of war. From Vlothe, the troop moved through to Langenholzhauzen (BB494). East of this point, the third platoon helped negotiate the surrender of Rinteln. From Langenholzhauzen the troop moved back through Assendorf (BB790) to cross the Weser at Hamlen. Slight resistance was encountered at Springe but the troop proceeded as far as Orie (C 4007), where they encountered heavy resistance consisting of bazooka, rifle and machine gun fire. By night fall we had advanced to Vohrum (X 6718), having covered approximately 30 miles for this period. Hehenhameln surrendered to the third platoon, taking 21 prisoners of war, 30 rifles and 1 anti-tank gun knocked out. The troop covered 20 miles the next day, meeting very light resistance and taking only 15 prisoners, stopping for the night at Meinersen

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(X7834). On the 11th of April the town of Roheberg (Y2361) was cleared resulting in the capture of 400 prisoners, two of which were generals from the XII Army Group, and the freeing of 1000 Russians and Poles and the adding of 38 more miles traveled. Verben on the Elbe was reached on the 12th of April, after a dash of 45 miles and the knocking out of 6 trucks, 1 half-track, 2 sedans and 1 motorcycle. The town of Beetsendorf surrendered to the third platoon without a struggle. One mobile ordnance company captured intact, contents: 9 trucks and 60 prisoners and one M. 109 destroyed by Private Hudspeth.

The troop was then given the mission of reconnoitering bridge sites on the Elbe River from northwest of Verben to East of Rabel, finally setting up OP's along this line. Two railroad trains were observed on the east side of the Elbe and through the rapid cooperation of the air force, successfully destroyed. The troop moved from the area of Verben to Vietzen, attached directly to the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and received the mission of mopping up the area south to Gardelegen to Klotze. Because the Task Force commander did not wish to keep his whole column moving, in order to save gasoline he attached one medium tank plus two squads of infantry to each platoon. This combination was ideal because it had direct fire power support and the infantry to expedite the clearing of towns where it was necessary to clear each building. The time allotted for this mission was two days but due to the successfulness of the above combination, the mission was completed the same day at 1500R 17 April 1945.

On the 18th of April the troop was given the mission of marking the route to Salzwedel for the command and then setting up a screen to the north. The march of the troop was good even though the personnel were extremely fatigued. This position of screening was maintained for two days and 60 prisoners were taken from area around Seeben. On the 20th of April, Combat Command "K" started their offensive north to Dannenberg. The troop was used once more for reconnoitering the axis of advance. Because of the heavy resistance encountered only tank force type reconnaissance was possible. By this I mean that the command task forces moved directly with the reconnaissance elements and fighting was encountered from Buchow until they took their objective 1 the following afternoon.

After remaining in Dannenberg for three days, we reverted to Squadron control, in place, and moved to the Squadron assembly area the following morning, 25 April 1945.

2 Incls.
Incl - 1 - Unit Journal
Incl - 2 - Incoming and Outgoing
Msgs file.

George C. Benjamin
GEORGE C. BENJAMIN,
Lt. Col., Cavalry,
Commanding.